Circa June 1993

Fact Sheet on U.S. Intervention in Peru

Why the People in Peru Say: "Yankee Go Home!"

• U.S. Dollars for Counterinsurgency
• Intervention Under the Cover of the "War on Drugs"
• Direct Intervention: Green Berets and Vietnam-Style Firebase
• Plots for Stepped-Up Intervention
• The U.S. Hand in Fujimori's Coup
• Backing for Fascist Repression
• The Yankee Hand in the Arrest of Abimael Guzmán and the Threats on His Life
• Now that You know the Facts, What are You Going to Do?

But here in the U.S., many are not aware of the extent of the U.S. government's intervention in this oppressed Third World country. They do not know that Washington props up a regime representing the interests of the small elite of rich and powerful who rule by fascist terror. And there is bias against the just war of liberation being waged by the people of Peru, with the leadership of the Maoist Communist Party of Peru (often called Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path).

The ruling class in the U.S. actively spreads lies and disinformation to promote such reaction against the people's war and to cover over their intervention against the revolution in Peru. But when those in the power structure talk among themselves, some of the truth comes out. A "Sendero expert" from RAND Corporation warned U.S. policy makers in March 1992: "The often heard claim that Sendero Luminoso is nothing more than a 'terrorist' organization that does not and cannot pose a viable threat to the central government of Peru is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the insurgency and the underlying dynamics of Shining Path activities. Sendero's operations, which have increased regularly since 1980, are the product of a much more extensive set of political and social networks that exist beneath the surface of large segments of Peruvian society. Between 25 and 40 percent of Peru is now estimated to have under either open or shadow Sendero administration."

And Representative Torricelli -- the head of the House Subcommitte on Western Hemisphere Affairs and a top planner of U.S. intervention in Latin America -- said last year that a victory of the Maoist people's war in Peru would result in "a major test for the new world order."

In Congress, the State Department, the Organization of American States and private research and human rights organizations, the sense is growing that the astonishing momentum being shown by the Shining Path rebellion is the toughest post cold war policy test on the horizon for the Western Hemisphere. -- New York Times, March 22, 1992

Such remarks reveal the truth: Behind the U.S. intervention against the people's war in Peru is a fear that an uncompromising revolution might win n Latin America-and a desire to protect imperialist interests in a region the U.S. rulers consider their "back yard." The U.S. is supporting the Peruvian government and its war against the people with military and economic aid, loans, training of troops, introduction of U.S. troops, coordinated intelligence operations, satellite surveillance, and other ways. There is evidence of deep U.S. involvement in the intense manhunt for Chairman Gonzalo (Abimael Guzmán), the leader of the Communist Party of Peru, and his arrest on Sept. 12 last year.

During the 1980s, many progressive and revolutionary-minded people stepped forward to oppose U.S. intervention and support the people in Central America. The bloody hand of the U.S. in Nicaragua and El Salvador was exposed to millions. This must also happen in Peru.

This fact sheet is intended to help people learn the truth about U.S. intervention in Peru. We will focus on U.S. military intervention and counterinsurgency in Peru. For an in-depth analysis of the economic domination of Peru by the U.S. see the four-part series, "The Yankee Hand Behind the Crisis in Peru," by Raymond Lotta in recent issues of the Revolutionary Worker.

U.S. Dollars for Counterinsurgency

• Money allocated to Peru from the "Military Assistance Program," just one component of military aid packages jumped from $2.5 million in 1989 to almost $24 million in 1991. (U.S. Dept. of Defense Almanacs, 1989 to 1992)

• April 1990-The U.S. announced a $35 million aid package for the Peruvian military, including plans for a new counter-insurgency base, training of six battalions, river patrol boats and refurbishing 20 ground-attack jets.

• May 1991-Bush and Peruvian President Fujimori signed a $200 million aid package, including $35 million in military equipment. The pact called for increasing the number of Green Berets and other U.S. personnel in Peru and training and equipping of two battalions of the Peruvian Army as well as units of the Navy and Air Force.

• Parts of the 1991 aid were withheld by the U.S. because of supposed "concern" about human rights violations by the Peruvian government. International human rights organizations documented that the Peruvian regime led the world four years in a row in the number of "disappeared"-people who are kidnapped by soldiers and are then found murdered or never heard from again. By late 1991 the U.S. "certified" that Peru had made "improvements," even though atrocities by the Peruvian military clearly continued. In January 1992 Bush announced the immediate release of $10 million in military aid and more later. The U.S. claimed the new aid would help the Peruvian military fight "guerrillas involved in the drug trade." (New York Times, 1/25/92)

• At a March 11, 1992 Congressional hearing on Peru, Bernard Aronson, top Bush official for Latin American policy, threatened: "If the U.S. and other democratic countries deny military aid to Peru, Sendero Luminoso will be in power by the year 1997." (Congressional transcripts)

• U.S. "economic aid" to prop up the Fujimori regime continued uninterrupted after the April coup. (Carol Andreas, Peru Scholars/News and Notes, December 1992)

• By June 3, 1992 the NY Times reported that the U.S. had resumed further "anti-narcotics" aid in response to "steps...Fujimori has made recently toward the restoration of democratic institutions." Just a few weeks earlier Fujimori's troops had killed in cold blood over 40 revolutionary prisoners of war at the Canto Grande Prison.

• December 1992-Fujimori held an election. The voting was so blatantly manipulated by the regime that even the major bourgeois electoral parties refused to participate. But the U.S.-dominated Organization of American States (OAS) "determined that Fujimori has made significant progress in restoring democracy, and agreed to end special scrutiny of Peru once its new Congress is installed." (Seattle Times, 12/15/92) The decision cleared the way for the U.S. and others to "normalize" relations with Fujimori and restore full economic and military aid, even though martial law continued to be in effect.

• January 9, 1993-General Joulwan, head of the U.S. Southern Command (based in Panama and responsible for U.S. forces in Latin America), met with Fujimori and top-level military leaders and visited the U.S.-built Santa Lucia counterinsurgency base. Three days later General Hermoza, head of Peru's joint chiefs of staff, said that the U.S. promised to resume full "anti-drug assistance" to the Peruvian government. Hermoza also said that two sophisticated U.S. radar bases will be reinstalled in the northern jungle regions. (NotiSur-South American and Caribbean Political Affairs,1/19/93)

• Another election farce held by Fujimori in February 1993 was praised by the U.S. as a further step toward "democracy" that should be rewarded with more aid. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. announced massive new loans for Peru. "Clinton Administration officials confirmed that the U.S. will take part in a $2 billion bank loan to Peru and is moving toward extending additional economic aid in the wake of the election." (San Francisco Chronicle, 2/25/93).

• March 30, 1993-The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) announced that it would give Peru $250 million in 1993.

Intervention Under the Cover of the "War on Drugs"

• Colonel John D. Waghelstein, writing in Military Review's February 1987 special issue on low-intensity warfare, openly revealed the real aim of the U.S. for insurgent movements in Latin America and suggested a way to counter this: "A melding in the American public's mind and in the Congress of this connection [between drugs and revolutionary insurgency] would lead to the necessary support to counter guerrilla/narcotics terrorists in the hemisphere."

• According to a 1991 report from the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes: "While the targets of the [U.S.] Andean programs include 'new' enemies-cocaine producers and traffickers-the 'old' enemies of Marxist insurgents are explicitly part of anti-narcotics programs in Peru and Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The plan included a foreign assistance package which was broken down into $1.11 billion in economic aid and $1.04 billion in military and law enforcement support to the three governments between 1990 and 1994.

• May 4, 1991 -- A U.S.-Peru military agreement said that when "subversive groups" are thought to "impede" the government's "anti-drug" operations, "counterinsurgency actions are a justifiable component of counter narcotics activities."

• A key way that the U.S. government directs the counterinsurgency in Peru is through its tight connections with a shadowy figure in the Fujimori regime who is widely know to be a CIA operative with connection to drug trafficking. This man is Vladimiro Montesinos, the main "advisor" to Fujimori. Gustavo Gorriti, considered Peru's most internationally prominent journalist, wrote in a 12/27/92 OpEd for the New York Times: "Mr. Montesinos built a power base and fortune mainly as a legal strategist for drug traffickers. He has had a close relationship with the CIA, and controls, the intelligence services and, through them, the military."

• In 1991 the National Intelligence Service controlled by Montesinos began to organize a secret intelligence unit with funding, training, and equipment from the CIA. Gorriti said that while this was supposedly an "anti-drug" unit, "it never carried out anti-drug operations. It was used for other things, such as my arrest." (New York Review of Books, 6/25/92). The Miami Herald (5/30/92) reported that Montesinos was invited to Washington by the CIA for talks. Afterwards he began to receive secret CIA funding, and he sent men to the U.S. for intelligence training. Fujimori's former Vice President, San Roman, said that the National Intelligence Service directly oversees the drug trade and is equipped with "the latest U.S. technology." (Reuters, 12/25/92)

• NY Times (3/25/93) reported that Clinton and the Congress were "quietly reversing a Bush administration anti-drug initiative that sent hundred of millions of dollars to South American governments." But National Public Radio reported last November 17 that Clinton is expected to continue "militarized eradication programs in the Andes." While calling for certain reductions in military spending, those close to Clinton envision an increase in "rapid deployment units, special operations forces, technological sophistication, unconventional operations and low-intensity warfare and intelligence capabilities." (Cited by Carol Andreas in Peru Scholars/News and Notes, December 1992)

Direct Intervention: Green Berets and Vietnam-Style Firebase

Yankee aggression, whether direct or indirect by way of puppet governments, is bringing about a war of national liberation, and despite the sacrifice and efforts this would require, there will be a magnificent opportunity to unite 90 percent of the Peruvian people, at a time when the Party is calling for the countrywide seizure of power. And this will mean more favorable, though more difficult, conditions for the Peruvian revolution. Imperialism is dreaming if it thinks it can snuff out the revolution, and while this period will he extremely difficult, complex and bloody, it will lead to the people's triumph and serve the emancipation of the class and the world proletarian revolution... Only through great storms, Chairman Mao said, can the world be changed. --Chairman Gonzalo, leader of the Communist Party of Peru from the speech "In Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution

• The Army Times (10/2/89) reported: "Despite denials by the Bush administration that U.S. forces have a direct combat role in the fight against South American cocaine cartels, Army Special Operations Forces [Green Berets] boast they are on the front lines in the escalating war on drugs."

• Latin America Regional Report (10/11/92) documented a 1987 training program for Peruvian officers in North Carolina: "U.S. officers have been...urging them to form small night patrols, to improve the psychological operations campaign, and to increase the army forces involved in counterinsurgency action...One U.S. official has acknowledged that 'it would be less than candid to say we don't give them examples of what has been tried and failed-or worked-in El Salvador and Vietnam.'"

• A Drug Enforcement Agency official testified at a Sept. 26, 1989 Congressional hearing: "At present, a team from the U.S. Special Forces is training our Peruvian counterparts and agents from the DEA have received extensive training, not only from the Special Forces, but also from other elements of the military establishment." He also said that DEA activities were "coordinated with the Marines, with the U.S. Army and with the Center for Low Intensity Conflicts." (El Diario Internacional, May 1991)

• In 1989 the NY Times reported that U.S. spy satellites started providing the Peruvian military with high-resolution space photos of poorly mapped regions of Peru where revolutionary base areas are located. The U.S. government also revealed that the National Security Agency was listening to all radio communications in the Andes.

• In February 1990 the U.S. opened a 100-acre firebase in Santa Lucia in the Upper Huallaga Valley-one of the areas in Peru where the Maoist guerrillas have a strong presence. The base cost $25 million per year to run and is the largest and most expensive U.S. military installation south of the Panama Canal. (Foreign Affairs, V. 69 No. 1, 1990) Visiting congressmen and journalists from the U.S. have compared it to the U.S. firebases during the Vietnam War.

• April 7-8, 1990 -- The first large-scale combat directly involving U.S. forces and the Maoist fighters took place at the Santa Lucia base. Units of the People's Guerrilla Army surrounded the base and poured in automatic rifle fire and rifle-propelled grenades for several hours, damaging helicopters and other military equipment.

• June 26, 1990 -- A group of U.S. congressmen sent a letter to George Bush which said that the rising U.S. aid to Peru "will result in landing the United States into another protracted guerrilla war in the third world. The number of U.S. military personnel in Peru is already on the increase." (El Diario Internacional, May 1991)

• A Jan. 12, 1992 news release from El Diario Internacional reported: "A column of Maoist guerrillas operating in the Upper Haullaga Valley shot down a helicopter manned by three U.S. military advisors and a member of the National Police...This hard-hitting attack by the Maoist is part of what the Peruvian military itself refers to as a sweeping advance by the People's Guerrilla Army, which has initiated open battles with the Armed Forces of Peru and on drugs,' are directly taking part in the civil war that has been going on for 11 years in Peru."

• Marine "advisers" have reportedly led search-and-destroy missions against villages sympathetic to the revolution. A July 1992 Penthouse article quoted a Green Beret officer who returned from Peru saying that burning down villages of peasants suspected of sympathizing with the Communist Party of Peru was "part of the training."

Plots for Stepped-Up Intervention

• In May 1987 Military Review commented on joint U.S.-Bolivian military maneuvers: "The recent operation in Bolivia is the first step. Instead of responding defensively to each insurgency according to each individual case, we could take action in concert with our allies."

• The Southern Command made plans for "an all-out hemispheric assault" against the "drug cartels." The plan was to be modeled after the December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama. (Newsweek, 7/19/90)

• At a Senate subcommittee hearing on May 7, 1992 General Joulwan reported on the 1991 Operation Support Justice II which went on for three months in the Andes region: 'We flew airborne detection and monitoring and intelligence collection missions. We worked with ambassadors and country teams to refine target data, deployed U.S. planning communications, medical, and helicopter maintenance prepared host nation forces for successful operations which occurred over a four week period in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia." (Congressional transcripts)

• A March 24, 1992 editorial in the NY Times called for "a military force for the Americas." The Times said that "the time has come to create a new inter-American military force that could intervene to protect democratic governments...A hemisphere intervention force is more likely to be accepted if Washington maintains a low profile. The U.S., as the region's major military power, is uniquely suited to certain logistical and reconnaissance tasks. But political control of the force needs to be shared broadly."

• NY Times (3/22/92) reported: "At the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based forum for leaders from the Americas, a formal study will ask whether concepts of sovereignty have changed enough in recent years that collective outside responses to internal crisis might be workable."

• A semi-secret U.S. military base in Bolivia near the border with Peru has reportedly undergone recent expansion. The U.S. press is spreading alarm about "expansion of operations" by the Communist Party of Peru across the Peru-Bolivia border. (For example, see NY Times, 9/5/92.) Brazil, a long-time "regional cop" for the U.S., has a big military role in Bolivia.

The U.S. Hand in Fujimori's Coup

Valdimiro Montesinos

• The CIA's man in Peru, Vladiiro Montesinos, is widely believed to have been a key figure behind the coup. Peruvian journalist Gustavo Gorriti, who was arrested and held for a few days after the coup, said in an interview: "It is now clear to me that Montesinos and Fujimori began plotting this coup with a small staff of military officers and intelligence analysts soon after the elections in July 1990, probably in late 1990." (The New York Review of Books, 6/25/92) The NY Times reported that a retired U.S. military officer "with close ties to the Peruvian Army" said Fujimori's coup plans "had been discussed for at least six months."

• In the months leading up to the April coup, Fujimori issued a series of fascist decrees. And according to Gorriti, "In the weeks before the coup, one tended to note signs that Fujimori might be planning something-one heard remarks at cocktail parties." (The NY Review of Books, 6/25/92) Yet the U.S. government made no moves or public statements against the impending coup.

• Bernard Aronson, the Bush administration's top official for Latin American policy, was in Lima holding high-level talks with Fujimori officials on the very day of the coup.

• Aside from continuing various forms of aid, the U.S. also gave Fujimori political backing. The NY Times (4/13/92) reported that "Washington has a great deal of sympathy for the threats Mr. Fujimori faces from drug traffickers and Maoist guerrillas" and had joined with the OAS in backing a "relatively restrained resolution on Peru." The article summed up that while "harshly condemning [the coup] in public," the OAS and the U.S. were refraining from "harsh" sanctions that would cripple his Government. The aim apparently is to buy him a little time to take the most urgent measures to get his country back under control."

• U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told an OAS meeting right after the coup: "No nation and no people need and deserve international solidarity and support more than the Peruvian nation and the Peruvian people. They confront the deepest economic crisis of their history, the violence and corruption of narcotraffcking, and the most murderous and dangerous terrorist movement that has ever appeared in Latin America." (NY Times, 4/13/92)

Backing for Fascist Repression

• March 12, 1992 -- At a hearing of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Bush administration's Bernard Aronson criticized the Peruvian courts for having a conviction rate of less than 10 percent for "accused terrorists." He announced that the U.S. was in its third year of a $3.4 million AID "administration of justice program." According to Aronson, this program helped Peru to "establish a national register of detainees" and make the legal system and police work more "efficiently" together. He said that another program had trained 120 Peruvian judges, prosecutors, and police officers in "proper police and investigative techniques." (Congressional transcripts) An AID official recently said that aid to strengthen Peru's court system "will be continued with resources coming from a wider agreement that is under negotiation with the Peruvian government and will be in place in 1994." The "judicial reform" project will be expanded to $15 million.

• May 2, 1992 -- Aronson went to Lima to talk to Fujimori and other high-level officials, including the Defense Minister and head of the Air Force. This was just four days before Fujimori launched the deadly assault on revolutionary prisoners at Canto Grande, but the U.S. claimed the plans for the prison attack were not discussed at Aronson's meeting. Aronson was a main speaker in a Congressional hearing on Peru in Washington on May 7. The prison massacre did not come up at all at the hearing. This silence amounted to a U.S. government seal of approval for the prison massacre.

• At the March 12, 1992 Congressional hearing, Aronson openly directed human rights organizations to come out with more attacks on the revolutionaries of Peru: "The international community, and respected human rights organizations, must focus the spotlight of world attention on the threat Sendero poses." While doing some important documentation of abuses by the Peruvian regime and military, groups like Amnesty International and Americas Watch have claimed that the guerrillas are also responsible for killing "innocent people" and that the people are "caught between two fires." This has allowed the Peruvian government to justify its own crimes. Former Peruvian Senator Rolando Ames told the Lima newspaper Expreso (10/5/92) that the government could disregard international condemnation of abuses because "important organizations that protect human rights like Amnesty International, Americas Watch or the U.S. State Department's own human rights office have clearly stated their condemnation of Sendero Luminoso." (Cited in a statement from the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, 10/16/92)

The Yankee Hand in the Arrest of Abimael Guzmán and the Threats on His Life

U.S. Soldiers operating radar equipment at the base known as "Gringolandia" in Yurimaguas, Peru

• In spring of 1992 the RAND corporation, a U.S. think tank, issued a detailed report (From the Sierra to the Cities- The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, by Gordon H. McCormick). Sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the report argued for a more systematic counterinsurgency focused on the guerrilla activities in Lima and on the leadership of the Communist Party of Peru. The report described the crucial importance of political leadership to this revolution and discussed the impact of capturing Party leaders: "Every time a committee member is captured or rounded up by the security forces, some small piece of the urban organization is compromised...In the case of senior or mid-level management, the response will of course be much more extensive and, hence, disruptive, involvement as it must large pieces of the urban network."

• U.S. Senate resolution #346 commended the DINCOTE, Peru's political police, for having "conceived and executed the plan to capture" the Communist Party of Peru leader Abimael Guzmán (known as Chairman Gonzalo). But the CIA had an important role in giving DINCOTE direction and technical help. According to Newsweek (9/28/92), DINCOTE has "grown is size, sophistication and success. With several hundred agents now using U.S.-supplied computers, phones and the latest investigative techniques (some taught by the Central Intelligence Agency), it has dismantled everything from the guerrillas' propaganda units to its 'popular schools.'"

• According to the NY Times (9/14/92), Rep. Torricelli said it was "certainly possible" that the U.S. had provided assistance to the operation to arrest Gonzalo. NY Times also reported, "U.S. officials refused to say whether American intelligence or military personnel were in any way involved in the events that led to Guzmán's arrest.

• At the time of Abimael Guzmán's arrest, Fujimori was away on a fishing trip and his interior minister was also out of Lima. This raises a question about who was really in command of the large and sophisticated operation against the Maoist leader. One important clue: The DINCOTE is overseen by the National Intelligence Service-which is controlled by CIA's man in the Fujimori regime, Montesinos.

• Guzmán's so-called "trail" was presided over by military generals wearing hoods. His lawyer was not permitted to present any kind of defense. Guzmán was quickly sentenced to life in prison and ordered held in isolation, without any visitors. He has been deprived of his medicine, glasses, reading material and consultation with lawyers. When asked for a statement on this, the U.S. State Department official said, "We have no comment on the judicial proceedings by which he was tried."

• The Fujimori regime has vowed to put the death penalty back into Peruvian law so that Abimael Guzmán could be officially executed. This effort has received backing from high-level figures in the U.S. Representative Torricelli told a reporter at a hearing shortly after Guzmán's arrest: "Personally, I think he should be executed." (Emergency Bulletin No. 15, International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán)

• William F. Buckley, a leading reactionary U.S. journalist, called for the execution of Guzmán: "There is no capital punishment in Peru except for treason involving a foreign government. But if you can suspend the constitution, you can make the necessary modifications to apply the ultimate sanction here. Mr. Guzmán's capture a month ago should have led to the same fate sufferd by Che Guevara...It is anomalous, to say the least, to suggest an international request for the execution of a prisoner, but...herewith a call for the execution of Abimael Guzmán." (Washington Times, 10/14/92)

NOW THAT YOU KNOW THE FACTS, WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO?

The people of Peru have risen up in revolutionary war against this oppression and injustice. A victorious revolution in Peru would be a tremendous blow to the U.S. empire in Latin America and worldwide. Large areas of Peru's countryside are already under revolutionary New Power -- where the masses of people are beginning to control their own destinies, overthrow feudal relations, and work collectively.

U.S. intervention is aimed against this just struggle of the people of Peru. The Yankee imperialists are working overtime to spread lies and confusion about the Communist Party of Peru and hide the truth about the U.S. role in Peru. They want people to remain silent about the vicious repression and exploitation going on in Peru-backed by U.S. guns. And they want a free hand in their plots against Chairman Gonzalo, who is seen by millions as their leader.

Those who know the truth have a responsibility to act on the side of justice -- and in acting, they can help shape the course of history in favor of the struggle of the oppressed people everywhere, including here in the belly of the beast. In the 1960s, the U.S. government tried to hide its crimes in Vietnam behind a wall of lies and disinformation. But the combined power of the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle and the fierce protest in the U.S. led to a humiliating defeat for the U.S. aggressors-a defeat welcomed by people around the world.

Now it's time to stop the U.S. intervention against the people's war in Peru!

DOWN WITH U.S. INTERVENTION IN PERU!

MOVE HEAVEN AND HEARTH TO DEFEND THE LIFE OF CHAIRMAN GONZALO!

VICTORY TO THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN PERU!